Two months before the United States went to war with Iran, the Army's top general warned the Pentagon that America's missile defenses were already in trouble — and would stay that way for years. According to a CBS News investigation published October 15, Gen. Randy George, then Army chief of staff, assessed in late December 2025 that the stockpiles of Patriot air-defense missiles and THAAD interceptors were critically low and would remain at strategically low levels until 2030.
The warning was not a casual remark. George's risk assessment was incorporated into the Pentagon's Global Force Management Allocation Plan, the defense secretary-approved annual order that determines where US troops and weapons go around the world. It was written as part of planning for fiscal year 2027, before the US-Israel-led war with Iran began and entered what is now its seventh month.
US officials familiar with the assessment told CBS News the shortfall had three main causes: Patriot missiles transferred to Ukraine after Russia's 2022 invasion, munitions expended defending Israel, and a defense industrial base that had lost the capacity to replace either quickly. CBS News is withholding the exact percentage figures it obtained for security reasons, and George declined to comment.
The war then made a tight situation worse. Citing estimates from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, CBS News reports the US entered 2026 with roughly 2,300 Patriot interceptors and used between 1,050 and 1,430 of them during the conflict — potentially up to 61 percent of the pre-war stockpile. THAAD fared worse: of about 355 interceptors on hand, an estimated 190 to 290 were expended, or roughly 82 percent.
One US official told CBS that even if the military stopped using both types of interceptors entirely, rebuilding stocks to the already-low December 2025 level could take until 2030. Replenishment is slow by design: CSIS estimates new THAAD interceptor contracts take more than four years to fulfill, and Patriot PAC-3 orders average about three and a half years.
George was ousted by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in April, while the war was underway. The Pentagon has pushed back on the reporting: its chief spokesman described the shortage claims as false and said the United States still had the weapons needed to carry out military operations and protect its forces.
Interceptors are not like artillery shells. Each one takes years and millions of dollars to build, and the US now faces demand on three fronts: the ongoing war with Iran, commitments to allies, and the contingency planners worry about most — a potential conflict with China. Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel and senior CSIS adviser, told CBS News that missile defense would be "huge" in any major confrontation with Beijing, which would demand interceptor supplies at enormous scale.
The strain is already visible beyond the Iran theater. CNN reported October 16 that Ukraine has run out of missiles for its US-made Patriot air defense systems, leaving it more exposed to Russian ballistic missile attacks. That is the direct consequence of the same allocation math George warned about: every interceptor sent to one theater is missing from another.
There is also an asymmetry worth noting. US officials told CBS the country still holds a significant stockpile of offensive munitions such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Small Diameter Bombs. The crisis is specifically in defensive interceptors — the weapons you need when someone else shoots first.
In January, Lockheed Martin announced plans to raise annual THAAD interceptor production capacity from 96 to 400 — a meaningful increase, but one that will take years to show up in warehouses. Whether that ramp-up arrives fast enough is now a question Congress is likely to press, along with whether the Pentagon's public denials match its internal planning numbers.
Watch for two signals in the coming weeks: whether NATO allies accelerate their own interceptor orders (a sign the shortage is real), and whether the next Global Force Management Allocation Plan reflects any easing. For now, the ousted general's five-year warning stands as the most specific public timeline of a vulnerability the US cannot manufacture its way out of quickly.